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In the following the concept of place will be analysed in the context of exhibits and exhibition spaces, and 
in particular in relation to digital media and the issue of “real” versus “virtual” places.  It is part of an effort 
to establish a framework for artefact-mediated learning in educational as well as museum contexts. In 
recent studies of museum and exhibition design there is an increasing interest in design theory based in 
cognitive sciences and semiotics (e.g. Kristiansen 2012; MacLeod, Hanks & Hale 2012; Monti & Keene 2013), 
but concepts are often used unanalysed, cf. the affordance concept (Allen and Gutwill 2004), or even 
implicitly, as when the affordance concept is hidden behind the notion of “usability” (Monti & Keene 2013). 
Our overall research questions are how objects, exhibits and exhibitions acquire meaning (cf. MacLeod, 
Hanks & Hale 2012; Diamantopoulou, Insulander & Lindstrand 2012) and how artefacts can mediate 
learning, but here specifically with regard to how affordances of artefacts and exhibition space (Achiam, 
May & Marandino, 2014) are linked to meaningful places, and how we should understand the difference 
between real and virtual place. We attempt to develop a concept of place, not as a metaphor (cf. Vors 
2012), but as directly implicated in meaning making.  
In the museum context artefacts are almost inevitably on display out-of-place (e.g. animals removed from 
their natural habitat, cultural artefacts removed from their context-of-use), even though the diorama can 
be seen as a re-contextualization of artefacts within a natural scenario (with limited realism). In a 
thoughtful paper (Leinhardt & Crowley 2002) ask: “why should people bother to visit museums when 
virtual copies of most objects in museums are so readily available?” Their answer is that cultural artefacts 
as well as natural objects offer a unique learning experience (in contrast to remediated representations) as 
a result of four features: (1) the “resolution and density of information” provided by physical objects, (2) 
the actual scale of real objects, (3) the authenticity of objects from natural or cultural history, and (4) their 
cultural value and uniqueness. One of their key examples is a burned out Greyhound bus in an exhibition 
about the civil rights struggles in US. Surprisingly they admit that this is not the real bus, although it refers 
to a particular incident in Birmingham, Alabama. This is a paradox with regard to their claim about the 
importance of authenticity and uniqueness of the museum object as opposed to a remediation of the event 
(a photograph or film clip could record the real bus). We do not, however, doubt that the replica of the 
burned out bus in fact works as intended, so the question is why it works without being “the real object”? 
There is a certain mystery about the experience of place and our attachment to places. At first it might 
seem straightforward: “place is not space”. We know this already from geography, architectural theory, 
and sociology. Whereas the real physical space we live in is an affordance space supporting and 
constraining our actions, this functional space cannot account fully for our relation to objects and events. 
Contrary to classical affordance theory (Gibson 1986), affordances cannot be directly perceived (May 2010). 
Although it might appear that we directly perceive affordances without any interpretation (e.g. that a 
staircase affords climbing), what our perceptual systems can in fact perceive are surface textures, 
geometric shapes, relative size of objects etc., whereas the possible actions made available by objects and 
events have to be inferred, i.e. they require a representational space in order to be apprehended. 
Intentions similarly refer to actions in the future, and they require a representational space for possible 
actions to be thought (in imagination or in language). A place cannot be reduced to a location in space, 
since it is really defined functionally and symbolically by the actions that can take place there. In an 
apartment space, for example, we clearly distinguish different places by their functional affordances and 
their symbolic meaning (e.g. a kitchen as a place for cooking and eating). A place can, however, be 
distributed over locations without losing its function and meaning as a single place: the place of a particular 
exhibition within a museum might span several rooms or floors. Spaces, on the other hand, can be 
decomposed into parts independent of their meaning and function, cf. the behavioural “space syntax” of 
visitor trajectories in exhibitions (Wineman & Peponis 2010; Monti & Keene 2013). The real mystery of 
place, however, is not in the separation of (real) physical space and (symbolic) representational space, but 
in the role of fantasies and emotions in supporting our subjective relations to places. We could consider this 
to be an emotional space superimposed or projected on the real space and its functional-symbolic places.  
With regard to the difference between real and virtual places this emotional space has a surprising 
consequence: since real and virtual places are supported equally well by our fantasies and emotional 
relation to objects and events, the apparently sharp distinction between real and virtual places breaks 
down. This is why the replica bus of the freedom rides of Alabama works perfectly well as an authentic 
object and why a multimedia immersive recreation of a street in Manila at the Tropenmuseum in  
Amsterdam (fig.1 left) can create a genuine sense of place: the situation will drag us into an emotional 
space - and the unique place of the historic event in the case of the Alabama bus. In the Manila exhibit the 
visitor can sit in the jeep and have an embodied experience of place, e.g. an experience of driving down a 
Manila street mediated by the different artefacts and multimedia of the exhibition space.  The concept of 
embodied experience plays an import role in modern analyses of meaning making in museums – including 
the foundation of the concept in phenomenology and cognitive science (MacLeod, Hanks & Hale 2012). 
   Fig. 
Fig. 1.  Left:  A virtual place in Manila: a street recreated through artefacts, photographs, video and ambient 
sound (Tropenmuseum, Amsterdam). Right:  Digitally augmented art in the “We AR in MOMA” virtual and 
invasive installation in the Museum of Modern Art, New York, October 2010, http://www.sndrv.nl/moma/  
The augmented reality superimposed on a MOMA exhibition (the “We AR in MOMA” virtual exhibition, Fig. 
1 right) or on the former Jewish bookshop in Berlin (in “The Writing on the Wall” installation, Fig. 3 left) 
might create new forms of interaction and “story-worlds” (Wood 2007), but the digital media does not 
create a completely new form of “mixed reality” as one may think (cf. Sandvik 2002): the historic places of 
Berlin, for example, are already “mixed reality” places, since they are real, symbolic and imagined realities 
all-in-one. The Writing on the Wall installation and its photographic documentation (Atttie 1994) link the 
historical past of 1930 with the present (of 1990) through the projection of historical photographs from 
pre-war Berlin on the actual (or close-by) buildings that remain in the city, but although this is an innovative 
form of installation art, the important point is not that this creates a new virtual or “mixed reality”, but that 
it supports our collective memory. It is emotionally moving because it externalises something that we 
already know but did not see in all its specificity: this was a “Hebraische Buchhandlung”, this was a man 
looking through its window. The effect is again one of (displaced) authenticity, as in the case of the burnt-
out-bus. 
Artefact-mediated sense of place does of cause not always work as intended. An example might be the 
experiment of co-articulating art and scientific visualization in Thorbjørn Lausten’s work “The Present - The 
Polar Space” (Nuet – Det Arkitiske Rum, 1996). In this exhibition live scientific data (e.g. weather data, 
movement of polar bears) was transformed into abstract diagrammatic representations that might function 
well as concept art, but because any iconic image-like recognition (May & Stjernfeldt 2008) of the arctic 
weather and environment was lost in the process, the exhibition did not create any sense of place or 
mediated presence in the Arctic as intended by the artist. Being told that the images were being updated 
live based on data transmitted from Greenland did not make any difference for most visitors. 
Furthermore any segment of space is not a place as demonstrated by the (normative) concept of non-
places in anthropology and cultural theory (Auge 1995). A non-place is devoid of meaning and emotion 
because it supports no particular relations or human identity. In our context here we would stress the lack 
of affordances provided by non-places other than going somewhere else (Fig. 2). 
   
Fig. 2. High-way like non-places in the Science Museum  of London, where visitors are not invited to do 
anything: they therefore mainly move along to local exhibitions within the museum space. Moving down 
the transportation theme hallway (left) visitors end up in large (secondary) reception area.  
Although affordances of objects and events are real and objectively present, they always appear to us 
within our phenomenal life-world and within changing situations, and the embodied meaning of our 
relation to these objects and events will therefore vary. This was also the origin of the concept of 
affordance in Gestalt psychology (Lewin 1917): the same object (e.g. a house in the countryside) can 
change its value and meaning completely, if the situation of the observer changes (e.g. from peacetime to 
wartime). As a soldier in World War 1 the young Kurt Lewin realized how different the “landscape of war” 
was from the familiar landscape in peacetime. A solider, a farmer and a wayfarer passing through a 
landscape might have completely different relations to objects in the same landscape. A house might be a 
home for the farmer, an aesthetic object for the wayfarer, and a danger zone for the solider. Even though 
there will be a partial overlap in the different experiences, the place as constructed in imagination will be 
different. The conclusion of Lewin is quite clear: what we call “seeing a hill” or “seeing a house” is not 
simply a sensory appropriation (“Wahrnemen”) of something in the world, but an imagination 
(“Vorstellen”) of these objects based on our specific relation to them in the given situation. This was a point 
of departure for his Topological Psychology (1936) – a theoretical foundation of social psychology that 
comes close to what would today be considered a “cognitive semantics” (Talmy 2000),  i.e. the cognitive 
foundation of meaning in grammatical and embodied schematic structures. 
   
Fig. 3. Left: Shimon Attie, “The Writing on the Wall” installation in Berlin 1990, here a Jewish bookstore of 
1930 projected on its place in Almstadtstrasse 43. Right: Keith Tyson, ”Large Field Array” exhibition of a 
multitude of individual exhibits aligned in a grid structure. 
Art installations like the ”Large Field Array” of Keith Tyson (Holm, Kold & Rank 2006), where visitors create 
their own meaning by moving around among different artefacts and exploring their potentially meaningful 
relations, recreate this fundamental “mixed reality” of place. The point is again that the installation reminds 
us of something we already know: it externalizes our associative and explorative thinking in the act of 
moving around different objects (Fig. 3 right). They have no inherent meaning other than lexical meaning, 
but because they are imposed on us in this orderly way, we interactively explore possible metaphorical 
relations, visual analogies and narratives between them. As a whole the installation becomes an 
externalized metaphor for how mind and language recreates the world as a place endowed with meaning. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Isolated artefacts from the “Large field array” of Keith Tyson: like words 
in a language, the fragments have no meaning beyond the lexical meaning until 
you actively create relations between juxtaposed objects. 
This phenomenological conception of place was a point of departure for the philosophy of Martin 
Heidegger (Malpas 2012). The way human beings exist is by “being there” (Dasein) in a place within a world 
we are co-constructing, building:  “Dwelling in this sense does not mean simply to dwell in (and build) a 
house, but to dwell in and build a whole world to which we are attached. Dwelling describes the way we 
exist in the world – the way we make the world meaningful, or place-like.” (Cresswell 2009).  
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